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Commercialization of the Internet has triggered an explosion of development
aimed at maximizing on-line communication. Multi-platform client-server
installations are becoming the enterprise network norm, and market forces are
causing new resources to be driven into networks on an almost daily basis.
Competitive pressures and a growing acceptance of remote management and
telecommuting are fueling the development explosion, and the end is not yet in sight.
This has put network administrators in a challenging position: They are being asked
to provide wide-scale, open access to heterogeneous networks, but to do so without
compromising overall security. The Computer Science Department at the University
o f Montana may upgrade some older RS6000 workstations (AIX4.1) with Pentium
PC workstations (Redhat LINUX). So we need a mechanism to unify the
heterogeneous networks (including AIX 4.1, Redhat LINUX, and NT4.0). At the
same time, we want to secure our heterogeneous networks as well as possible. The
Kerberos Authentication Server is a desirable solution to this situation. Kerberos
Authentication Server provides a common security implementation at a very basic
level that prevents the weaknesses of one system from compromising the strengths of
the other.

Contents

1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Problem Description...............................................................................................1
1.2 Proposed Solution................................................................................................... 3

2 Kerberos Authentication Server...................................................................................5
2.1

History of Kerberos................................................................................................ 5

2.2 Authentication, Integrity, Confidentiality, and Authorization............................7
2.3 How Kerberos w orks..............................................................................................8
2.3.1 Kerberos Encryption..........................................................................................8
2.3.2 What are the Kerberos Tickets.........................................................................9
2.3.3 How Kerberos Authentication Works............................................................. 9
2.3.4 Kerberos Cross-Realm Authentication.......................................................... 15
2.4 Kerberos V4 vs. Kerberos V 5 .............................................................................18
2.5 Kerberos Limitations............................................................................................ 21

3 Implementation of U nification.................................................................................23
3.1 Possible Implementations..................................................................................... 23
3.1.1 The KDC servers............................................................................................. 23
3.1.2 The Application Servers and Clients.............................................................. 24

3.1.3 Some Issues about the login process..............................................................25
3.1.3.1 Local Login to Unix workstation(AIX, Redhat LIN U X ).....................25
3.1.3.2 Local Logon to N T W orkstation/Server............................................... 26
3.1.3.3 Over-the-network telnet from Windows 95/N T to U N IX .................28
3.1.4 Password Synchronization and User Account Setup....................................30
3.1.5 The Cost of Deploying Kerberos....................................................................33
3.2 Two Test Network M odels.................................................................................. 33

4 A Multi-threaded Implementation of Kerberized FTP for Windows 95/N T 36
4.1

Using “Kerberized” Applications........................................................................36

4.2

Introduction to GSSAPI.......................................................................................37

4.3 FTP Security Extension....................................................................................... 39
4.3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 39
4.3.2 The FTP Security Extension Standard........................................................... 40
4.4 Implementation of Kerberized FTP....................................................................41
4.4.1 Implementation of the Authentication P a rt.................................................. 42
4.4.2 How to use the Kerberized F T P .....................................................................44

5 C on clusions................................................................................................................... 49

iv

List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Complete Kerberos V4 Authentication Protocal (simplified).................... 12
Figure 2.2. Complete Kerberos V5 Authentication Protocal (simplified).................... 13
Figure 2.3. Kerberos V4 Inter-realm Authentication Protocol (simplified)................. 15
Figure 2.4. Kerberos V5 Inter-realm Authentication Protocol (simplified)................. 16
Figure 2.5. Kerberos V4 Realm Interconnections........................................................... 19
Figure 2.6. Kerberos V5 Hierarchy of Realms.................................................................19
Figure 3.1. Interface of ntpassw d..................................................................................... 32
Figure 3.2. Model O n e ...................................................................................................... 35
Figure 3.3. Model T w o ..................................................................................................... 35
Figure 4.1. Login Authentication State Diagram.............................................................43
Figure 4.2. Initial Kerbnet Interface................................................................................. 44
Figure 4.3. After obtaining Ticket Granting Ticket........................................................ 45
Figure 4.4. GSS_FTP Initial Interface.............................................................................46
Figure 4.5. After Logon..................................................................................................... 47
Figure 4.6. After obtaining FTP service ticket................................................................48

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
In recent years, multi-platform distributed computing installations are becoming
more popular. With the use of the Internet becoming more and more extensive, the
networks that were previously private are now connected to the Internet. That
exposes a lot of security problems on an open network.
This has put network administrators in a challenging position: They are being
asked to provide wide-scale, open access to heterogeneous networks and to achieve
higher security. Perhaps the most difficult problem is to unify the U N IX /N T /M A C
networks.

U N IX /N T /M A C

administrators

have

the

formidable

task

of

implementing disparate security solutions on fundamentally different operating
systems, then combining those solutions to create uniform access and management
across the entire network. The risk is that the combined solution can yield a result
that is weaker than the weakest link of any single operating system’s security alone.
The CS department of the University of Montana may replace some old AIX
workstations with LINUX workstations. So the CS department needs a mechanism
to maintain a global user account database for the heterogeneous networks (including
1
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AIX 4.1, LINUX, N T 4.0) At the same time, the CS department wants to secure the
heterogeneous networks as well as possible. After the replacement, the CS
department will have AIX workstations, LINUX workstations, and N T workstations.
The goals are:
•

A Global user account database, which means that any user must be able to login
to the same account with the same password on any workstation

•

Users should be able to change their passwords from any workstation

•

Any system must work with a shadow password system on both AIX and LINUX

•

Users should be able to access any workstation over the Internet (for example, a
student or faculty should be able to login to a workstation using a PPP
connection to an ISP from home)

•

Unencrypted passwords should not be transferred over the network

•

The solution should be relatively easy for the system administrator to maintain

•

All of the system administrator’s tasks and as many as possible of other tasks
should be able to be done through an encrypted session

•

The solution should be easy for users to use

•

The client programs like FTP and TELNET should be easy for CS students to
install on personally-owned PCs

3

1.2 Proposed Solution
The fundamental issue in implementing security for a U N IX /N T environment is
to provide a common security implementation at a very basic level that prevents the
weaknesses of one system from compromising the strengths o f the other. The richer
this common implementation is, the more security can be enhanced for both systems.
The Kerberos Authentication Server, which was developed by MIT, IBM and
DEC implements a third-party authentication layer that unifies UNIX and N T user
administration, authentication, and authorization, and provides functional uniformity
for administering.
Cygnus Inc. developed a commercial version of Kerberos, KerbNet, which
contains Kerberos server and client applications for both UNIX and NT. Using a set
of technologies that create a security layer which is implemented and managed
identically on both UNIX and N T systems, KerbNet software was announced to
conform the following U N IX /N T distinctions:
Since a user-ID in N T is completely alien to U N IX and vice-versa, the most difficult
components to unify are the different user authentication models. KerbNet software surmounts this
problem by utilising a single trusted server which other systems access over the network. This trusted
serverprovides a central repositoryfor usernames andpasswords, as well as some access control audit
information.
KerbNet software authenticates users and application servers and provides administrators with a
unified method of managing passwords and access on allplaforms in the system. With enterprise-
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wide authentication, administrators are assured of the identities of users and servers. With this
assurance, single sign-on can be used system-wide at both network and application levels.
From a user standpoint, the KerbNet interface provides single-login convenience and seamless
access to network resources. From an application-development standpoint, KerbNet software relieves
developers of the burden of having to providefunctionality to accommodate new users orgroups.
Sind for administrators, KerbNet software provides a uniform interface from which they can see
exactly who users are at any moment and add, delete, or manage identifications and authorisations
system-wide, regardless of the operating systemplaform. [14]
Actually from my point o f view, KerbNet doesn’t achieve all o f the above. If
Kerbnet is really used to unify U nix/N T/M ac environment, there is a password
synchronization problem. Due to the conflict of the N T native authentication
protocol and the Kerberos authentication protocol, in order to achieve single sign-on,
a user’s N T domain password must be the same as the user’s Kerberos password. I
will talk about this in detail in chapter 3.
At a recent developer’s conference, Microsoft announced that N T version 5.0 will
include Kerberos authentication. This endorsement of Kerberos legitimizes the
technology as a foundation for network security. With this initiative, Microsoft will
also be making available Kerberized file and print services for current Windows 95
installations. Microsoft's direction to provide N T Kerberos services and Kerberized
applications ensures that future Windows N T and Windows 95 users will have full
access to Internet standard security services.

Chapter 2
Kerberos Authentication Server
2.1 History of Kerberos
In 1983, MIT, in cooperation with IBM and DEC, started an eight-year project
designed to integrate computers into the university’s undergraduate curriculum. This
project was called Project Athena.
At the beginning, nearly 50 traditional time-sharing minicomputers—Digital
Equipment Corporation’s VAX 11/750 systems running Berkeley 4.2 UNIX, were
used by project Athena. Each VAX had a few terminals; when a student or faculty
member wanted to use a computer, he/she sat down at one of its terminals.
Within a few years, the project received a lot of funds to update equipment.
Hundreds o f networked workstations replaced the VAX 11/750s. The project's goal was
to allow any user to sit down at any computer and enjoy fu ll access to his files and to the network
[12].

After the workstations were deployed, the network was accessible from all over
the MIT campus. It was impossible to prevent students (or outside intruders) from
running network spy programs. It was also nearly impossible to prevent the students
from intercepting the root user passwords of the workstations. Even worse, many of
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the computers on the network were IBM PC/ATs that didn’t have even the basic
operating system security. Something had to he done to protect student files in the networked
environment to the same degree that they wereprotected in the time-sharing environment [12].
Athena’s ultimate solution to this security problem was Kerberos. Kerberos is an
authentication system that uses D ES cryptography to protect sensitive information such as passwords
on an open network. When a user logs in to a workstation running Kerberos, that user is issued a
ticket from the Kerberos Authentication Server. The user’s ticket can only be decrypted with the
user’s password; it contains information necessary to obtain additional tickets, From that point on,
whenever the user wishes to access a network service, an appropriate ticket for that service must be
presented. A s all of the information in the Kerberos tickets is encrypted before it is sent over the
network, the information is not susceptible to eavesdropping or misappropriation [12].

2.2 Authentication, Integrity, Confidentiality,
and Authorization
Neuman and Ts’o [1] give some general definitions:
•

A p rin c ip a l is the party whose identity is verified.

•

T he verifier is the party who demands assurance of the principal’s identity.

•

D ata in te g rity is the assurance that the data received is the same as generated.

•

A u th en tica tio n is the verification of the identity of a party who generated some data, and of
the integrity of the data.
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•

C on fid en tia lity is the protection of informationfrom disclosure to those not intended to receive
it.

•

A u th o riza tio n is the process by which one determines whether a principal is allowed to
perform an operation [1].
For example, when a user telnets to remote machine, the remote machine’s telnetd

daemon is the verifier, the user is the principal, and the user’s identity need to be
verified by the verifier — the remote telnetd daemon. Authorization is usually
performed after the principal has been authenticated. Normally, authentication and
authorization occur at the same time.
The section concentrates on authentication for real-time, interactive services that
are offered on computer networks. The term real-time is used to mean that a client
process is waiting for a response to a query or command so that it can display the
results to the user. This class o f services includes remote login, file system reads and
writes, and information retrieval for applications like web browser.

2.3 H ow Kerberos works

A series of encrypted messages is used by the Kerberos Authentication System to
prove to a verifier (server) that a client is running on behalf of a real claimed user.
The remainder of this section describes the Kerberos protocol. The description is
simplified for clarity; additional fields are present in the actual protocol. Readers
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should consult RFC 1510 [4] for a more thorough description of the Kerberos
protocol.

2.3.1 Kerberos Encryption
Kerberos is an authentication system based on the secret key cryptography. In the
Kerberos Version 4, the only encryption method supported is the data encryption
standard (DES). A property of DES is that if the encrypted data is decrypted with the
same key used to encrypt it, the original data appears. If different encryption keys are
used for encryption and decryption, or if the encrypted data is modified, the result
will be unreadable, and the checksum in the Kerberos message will not match. Due
to the U.S. regulation limiting the export of DES, in Kerberos Version 5, an
encryption algorithm identifier tag is appended on each Kerberos message, which
allows the user to configure Kerberos to use alternative encryption algorithm other
than DES. But so far, all implementations of Kerberos Version 5 use DES. A
standard for a public key version of Kerberos is under consideration.

2.3.2 What are the Kerberos Tickets
•

Each service registered in Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS) needs to share a
secret key with the KAS, this secret key is called the server key. For example,
FTP, TELN ET and other services need to share a server key with the KAS
respectively.
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•

A Service Granting Ticket (SGT) consists of a set of information that can be
used by the client to apply for service provided by a specific application server.
Normally, the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) issues a SGT. A separate SGT is
needed for different service. For example, a FTP ticket is needed for the FTP
service and a HOST ticket is needed for the TELNET service.

•

Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is issued by the KAS and used to obtain
multiple SGTs from the TGS later within a limited period (normally 8 hours). The
TG T is kind of like a general ticket for Disney Land. Once a tourist obtains this
general ticket, the tourist can get the access to any service supplied by the Disney
Land within a day.

2.3.3 H o w Kerberos Authentication Works
Under Kerberos Version 5, the user first types in his/her user ID and password.
Then the client sends a message to the KAS that includes the user ID, the name of
the TGS service, the requested TG T expiration time, and a random number, all
encrypted with the user’s password (message 1 in figures 2.1 and 2.2). The client uses
this message to request a TGT for the user represented by itself. When the KAS
receives the message, it finds the claimed user’s password from its password database,
and tries to decrypt the message using the user’s password. If the decryption
succeeds, the KAS assumes that the running client really represents the claimed user.
Then the KAS generates a one-time encryption key known as the session key and a
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TG T that contains the session key; the TGT is encrypted with the TGS server key
and the session key with other information are encrypted with the user’s password.
This prevents the TGT from being modified and guarantees that only the real user
can extract the session key. The KAS sends the encrypted TGT and session key back
to the client (message 2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2). The client decrypts the encrypted
session key using the user’s password, stores the encrypted TGT and the decrypted
session key into a temporary file, and forgets the user’s password. Next, the client will
use the TG T and session key to obtain the SGTs as needed. Through messages 1 and
2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2, the client obtains the TGT and session key without
transferring the user’s password over the network at all.
When the user wants to use any service, the user needs to obtain a SGT for that
requested service. The client sends the encrypted TG T and a request for that service
which is encrypted with the TGS session key to the TGS (message 3 in figures 2.1
and 2.2). Upon the receipt of the message 3, the TGS decrypts the encrypted TGT
with its server key, extracts the session key and tries to decrypt that request with the
session key. So the TGS knows that the client has requested a SGT for that requested
service. Then the TGS generates another session key which is shared between the
client and the requested service and encrypted with the original TGS session key, and
an SGT for that requested service which contains the session key and is encrypted
with that requested service’s server key. The TGS sends them back to the client
(message 4 in figures 2.1 and 2.2).
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Upon the receipt of the message 4, the client decrypts the session key with the
original TGS session key, and stores the encrypted SGT and the decrypted SGT
session key into the same temporary file. Then the client sends the message 5 in
figures 2.1 and 2.2 to the requested service. Message 5 consists of two parts:
authenticator and encrypted SGT. The authenticator consists of the current time, a
checksum, and an optional encryption key, all encrypted with the SGT session key.
Upon the receipt of the message 5, the server decrypts the encrypted SGT with its
server key, extracts the SGT session key, and tries to decrypt the authenticator. If the
same key is used to encrypt and to decrypt on the same authenticator, the checksum
in the authenticator will match. So the server can be sure that the client is running to
represent the claimed user, since the client knows the session key. In some cases, the
client wants to verify the identity of the server. If mutual-authentication is required,
the message 6 in figures 2.1 and 2.2 is used.
At this point, the user has access to the service. Later, if the user wants to use
other services, the client will go through from messages 3 and 5 (message 6, if
needed) to obtain the corresponding SGT for the requested service and to get the
access. The user doesn’t need to type his/her password anymore. The single sign-on
is achieved by obtaining the TGT through messages 1 and 2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
For further details of the Kerberos Authentication Server, please see [1, 2, 3, 4,
15]-
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TGS
i

Client

Server

1. Client KAS: C, Tgs, Tim eexp, N
2. KAS -> Client: {KcTgs ,Tgs, Tim eexp,N, {Tc>TgJ K Xf,s}K c
3. Client ^ TGS: {CT, ... }I<c>Tgs, {Tc>Tgs}KTgs, Tim eexp , N
4. T G S
Client: { K ^ , V, Tim eexp, N , . . . }Kc,Tgs, {TC,V}KV
5. Client -» Server {CT, CK, K opt, . . . }KCV, { T ,,} K V
6. Server Client {C T ,.. . }K CV (optional)
KAS: K erberos A uthentication Server
TGS: T icket G ranting Service (usually exists in the same m achine with KAS)
C: Client’s nam e
V: V erifier’s nam e (Server’s name)
Tgs: T G S ’s nam e
N: A ran d o m num ber (used to m atch the authentication response
w ith the request)
T im eexp: R equested expiration tim e for the ticket
C T : C urrent time
CK: Checksum
K c: U ser’s passw ord
K^: Server key (shared betw een server and KAS)
K cv: Session key (Client w ith Server)
K cTgs: Session key ( Client w ith TGS)
T. lg; T icket to T G S {Kc>Tgs, C, Tim ecxp, ...}
T cv: T icket to the Server {Kcv , C, Tim eexp, . ..}
F igure 2.1 C om p lete Kerberos V4 A u th en ticaion P rotocol (sim p lified )
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Client

Server

1. Client -> KAS: C , {C, Tgs, T im e ^ , N } K C
2. KAS
CHent: {Kc>Tgs,Tgs, Tim eexp,N }K c , {Tc,Tgs}KTgs
3. CUent ^ TGS: {CT, . . . }K c>Tgs, {TCiTgs}KTgs, Tim eexp , N
4. T G S ^ CUent: {Kc>v , V, Tim eexp, N , ... }K c;rgs, { T J K ,
5. CUent Server {CT, CK, K opt, ... }K C>V, { T ^ K ,
6. Server Client {C T ,.. . }K CV (optional)
KAS: K eberos A uthentication Server
TGS: T icket G ranting Service (usually exists in the same m achine w ith KAS)
C: CHent5s nam e
V: V erifier's nam e (Server's name)
Tgs: T G S 's nam e
N: A ran d o m num ber(used to m atch the authentication response
w ith the request)
T im eexp: R equested expiration tim e for the ticket
CT: C urrent tim e
CK: Checksum
K c: U ser's passw ord
K^: Server key (shared betw een server and KAS)
K cv: Session key (CHent w ith Server)
K CjTgs: Session key ( CHent with TGS)
T c,Tgs: Ticket to T G S {KcTgs, C, Tim eexp, ...}
T cv: T icket to the Verifier(Server) {Kcv , C, Tim eexp, . ..}
F igure 2.2 C om p lete Kerberos V ersion 5 A u thenticaion P rotocol (sim plified)
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2.3.4 Kerberos Cross-Realm A uthentication
A. full-service Kerberos environment consisting of a Kerberos server, a number of clients and a
number of application servers, requires thefollowing:
•

The Kerberos server must have the User ID and password of all participating users in its
database. A.H users are registered with Kerberos server.

•

The Kerberos server must share a secret key with each server. A.U servers are registered with the
Kerberos server.

Such an environment is referred to as a realm [15].
It’s impractical for networks in different organizations to register in the same
realm. Instead, the networks in different organizations are in different realms.
Sometimes, a user registered in one realm needs to use the server registered in
another realm, which leads to a cross-realm authentication problem. To enable the
cross-realm authentication between two realms, a secret key needs to be generated
and shared between the two realms. In order for a user registered in the local realm to
use a server registered in a remote realm, the user must obtain a SGT for the remote
server. The client uses messages 1 and 2 in figures 2.3 and 2.4 to obtain the TG T for
the remote realm. Then the client uses the TG T for the remote realm to request a
SGT for the remote server from the remote TGS through the messages 3 and 4 from
figures 2.3 and 2.4. As soon as the remote KAS detects that the TG T was issued in a
different realm, it finds the cross-realm key, verifies the validity o f the TGT, and then
generates and issues a SGT and session key to the remote client. The authentication
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of the local client to the remote server is the same as that in the same realm. For
further details of Kerberos cross-realm authentication, please see [1, 3].

remote

Client local

Server,remote

1. Client
T G S loca]: {Ac}K c>tgs, tgsiem , {Tctgs}K,gs
2. T G S loca,
Client: {K^jtgsrem,{Tc,tgsrm}Ktgsrem}K c>tgs
3. Client
4- T G S remote

5. CUent

T G Siemote: {A c}K Cjtgsrem, {Tc,tgsrcm}Ktgsrem, Srem

Client: { K c > w {Tc,srem}Ksrem}Kc,,gs„m
ServetrcmoK: {Ac} K c > w {Tc,srem}K S[em

6. Serverremote -> CUent: { A J K c,Srem(optional)
A c: A uthenticator (different for different message)
T G S locaI: Local Ticket G ranting Service
T G S remote. R em ote Ticket G ranting Service
tgs: T G S local’s nam e
tgs rem : T G S lemote’s nam e
K c>t : Session key ( Client w ith T G S loca])
K^gSrem: Session key( CUent w ith T G S remote)
Kc,srem• Session key ( Client with R em ote Server)
T c,tgs: Ticket to T G S local
T c .tg w Ticket to T G S lemote
K ^ : T G S local key know n only by T G Sloca]
Krgsrem: Inter-realm key shared with T G S local and T G S remote
K Srem: R em ote Server key shared with T G S remote
Figure 2.3 Kerberos V4 Inter-realm A u th en ticaion Protocol (simplified)
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local

remote

Server,remote

1. Client -> T G S lncal: { A J K ctgs, tgsrera , { T ^ J K ^
2. T G S ]oc,| -> Client: {Kc,tgstem }K c,tgs, {Tc,tgsrern }Ktgs,ern
3. C lie n t-^ T G S remot(,: {AJIC;,tgs[ern, {’l'c,tgs[em} Ktgsr,.rn, Sr,.,
4. T G S temot(,

Client: {K c,s[em}Kc,tgsrera, {Tc,srera } K S[em

5. C H e n f> Servertemote:{ A J Kc,srem, {Tc,stem}Kstem
6. Serverremote

CHent: { A J K c,srera (optional)

A c: A uthenticator (different for different message)
T G S local: Local Ticket G ranting Service
T G S remote. R em ote Ticket G ranting Service
tgs: T G S local’s nam e
tgs rem : T G SremoK’s nam e
K c tgs: Session key ( Client with T G S local)
K c,tgsrem: Session key( Client w ith T G S remote)
K c,srem: Session key ( Client w ith Rem ote Server)
T c,tgs: Ticket to T G S local
Tc,tgsfem: Ticket to T G S remotc
T G S localkey know n only by T G S local
I<Ctgsrern: Inter-realm key shared with T G S local and T G Sremote
Ksrem: R em ote Server key shared w ith T G S remote
F igure 2.4 Kerberos V5 Inter-realm A u thenticaion P rotocol (sim p lified )
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2.4 Kerberos Version 4 vs. Kerberos Version 5
Initial login:
With Kerberos Version 4, after a user types his/her ID, the client sends a message
to the Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS) that includes the user’s ID, a request for a
TGT, and other information. The KAS checks its database, finds the user’s password,
sends back a credential that is encrypted with the user’s password. The client then
prompts the user to type in his/her password and finally tries to decrypt the
encrypted credential with the password that the user has typed. If the decryption is
successful, the client then forgets the user’s password, and stores the credential into a
temporary file. If the decryption fails, the client knows that the user typed the wrong
password and gives the user a chance to try again. This scenario makes Kerberos
Version 4 susceptible to offline password-guessing attacks. An attacker could simply
modify the login program, ask a KAS for a TGT for a particular user, then copy it
into a file, then try to decrypt that ticket with every word in the dictionary. For
example, an attacker might write a kerberized “kinit” for W in95/N T that obtains the
TGT, but this “kinit” simply stores the encrypted TGT into a file. Since the PC on
which the attacker is running the “kinit” is entirely under the control o f the attacker,
the attacker can apply a password-guessing process at his/her leisure.
With Kerberos Version 5, the client doesn’t contact the KAS until the user has
typed his/her password. Then the client sends a message to the KAS that consists of
the user’s ID, a request for a TGT, a random number and etc., all encrypted with the
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user’s password. The KAS looks up the user’s ID, finds his/her password, and tries
to decrypt the message. If the decryption succeeds, the KAS then creates a credential
that is encrypted with the user’s password, and sends it back to the user. The KAS
can be set up to allow a fixed number of login attempts. This will effectively prevent
a password-guessing process.

Inter-realm Authentication:
With Kereros Version 4, in order to connect n realms completely,

1) key

exchanges are required (see figure 2.5). Even with only a few cooperating realms, the
assignment and management of the inter-realm keys is an expensive task.
With Version 5, a hierarchy based on the name of the realm is supported (see
figure 2.6). A source realm can communicate directly with a destination realm if it
shares an inter-realm key direcdy with the destination realm. Or if it shares a key with
an intermediate realm that shares an inter-realm key with the destination realm, the
source realm can communicate with the destination realm through the intermediate
realm too. Each realm needs to share a unique inter-realm key with its parent node
and each of its child nodes. This arrangement reduces the number o f key exchanges
to 0(log(n)).
For further details, please see [1, 3].
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2.5 Kerberos Limitations
Kerberos is a good solution to solve the security problems on an open network,
but it still has several shortcomings:
•

E ve ry n e tw o rk service m u s t be in d ivid u a lly m o d ifie d fo r use w ith K erberos
[12]. Due to the design o f the Kerberos, each application must be modified to
use Kerberos for authentication. The process of modifying an application is called
Kerberizing the application. To Kerberize an application, the application’s source
code is required.

•

K erberos d o e sn ft w ork w ell in a tim e-sharing en viro n m e n t Kerberos is designed
for an environment in which there is one userper workstation. Because of the difficulty of sharing
data between differentprocesses running on the same U N IX computer, Kerberos keeps tickets in
the “/ tmp ” director)). I f a user is sharing the computer with several other people, it is possible
that the user's tickets can be stolen, that is, copied by an attacker, stolen tickets can then be used
to obtain fraudulent service [12]. This problem is much worse for a shared PC or Mac
running an insecure operating system like Windows 95/98 or MacOS. If an
attacker has stolen other user’s tickets and the attacker is familiar with Kerberos
API or GSSAPI and the Kerberizing process, the attacker can write a program to
use that user’s stolen ticket to impersonate that user.

•

K erberos requires a secure K erberos server. By design, Kerberos requires that there
be a secure central server that maintains the master password database. To ensure security, the
Kerberos server should be run on a secure dedicated machine [12]. Any unnecessary services
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(such as POP, FTP and R-commands daemons) should be shut down. The
Kerberos server must be kept in a physically secure place.
•

K erberos requires a co n tin u o u sly available K erberos server [12]. If the
Kerberos Authentication Server goes down, the whole Kerberos network can not
be used. So normally, a backup Kerberos Authentication Server called slave KDC
is needed.

•

K erberos stores all pa ssw o rd s en cryp ted w ith a sin g le k e y [12]. All passwords
stored in the Kerberos server are encrypted with the server’s master key, which
resides on the same hard disk as the encrypted passwords. This means that, in
case the Kerberos server is compromised, all user passwords are compromised.

•

K erberos does n o t p ro te c t against m o d ifica tio n s to system softw are (Trojan
horses). Kerberos does not have the computer authenticate itself to the user; so there is no way
for a user sitting at a computer to determine whether the computer has been compromised [12]. A
knowledgeable attacker can easily exploit this weakness. For example, an attacker
could simply modify a workstation’s system login program which copies every
username/password combination typed into a file. Later, the attacker can
impersonate these users using their passwords.

•

K erberos m a y resu lt in a cascading lo ss o f trust. A.notherproblem with Kerberos is
that i f a serverpassword or a userpassword is broken or otherwise disclosed, it is possible for an
eavesdropper to use that password to decrypt other tickets and use this information to spoof
servers and users [12].

Kerberos is a workable system based on the secret key cryptography for network
security, and it is widely used. A system based on public key cryptography would
probably be simpler and perhaps more secure. A more secure authentication system
would combine:
1. Something that a user knows (e.g. password).
2. Something that a user has (e.g. a smart card or a token).
3. Something that a user is (e.g. fingerprint, face recognition, etc.).

Chapter 3
Implementation of Unification

3.1 Possible Implementations
3.1.1 T he KDC servers
To unify the heterogeneous networks (AIX4.1, Redhat LINUX, and N T 4.0)
using a Kerberos Authentication server, a master KDC and a slave KDC are needed.
Because the more other services that are run on the KDCs, the greater the possibility
is that the KDCs could be compromised, the KDCs should be dedicated servers
which are only used for authentication. The CS department at the University of
Montana doesn’t want to spend a lot of money on these servers, since the CS
department is not very big and the authentication workload is not very heavy. So a
solution might be to use two Intel486 LINUX machines as KDCs. That should be
enough for the CS department. The KDCs must be located in a physically secure
place. If the KDCs are compromised, the whole network will be compromised.
When a user changes his/her Kerberos password, only the master K D C’s password
database has been updated. Any changes of password only occur on master KDC. In
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order to let the slave KDC know about password changes, a cron job needs to be set
up to make the master KDC to periodically propagate the password database to the
slave KDC. Another cron job also needs to be set up, which periodically propagates
the current time from the KDC to other machines. If the time difference (clockskew)
between clients and KDC is larger than 5 minutes, authentication will fail, even with
the correct password.

3.1.2 T he Application Servers and Clients

All A IX /LIN U X machines except for the KDCs can be both application servers
and clients. To use Kerberos authentication server, the Kerberized daemons and
clients must replace the existing daemons and clients. The Kerberized daemons
include telnetd, ftpd, klogind, kshd..., the Kerberized clients include telnet, ftp,
klogin, ksh, kinit, kdestroy, kpasswd... A configuration file “krb5.conf” also needs to
be copied into “/e tc ” subdirectory. Actually, the same copy of “krb5.conf’ is shared
among all the machines. To obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) implicitly when a
user logs in, the regular login must be replaced with the Kerberized login —“klogin”.
So when a user logs in, the user has obtained a TGT implicitly, the user doesn’t need
to use “kinit” to get it explicitly. When the user logs out, all his/her tickets need to be
deleted using “kdestroy”. In case that the user forgets to do this, “kdestroy” should
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be added to his/her “.logout” file. The user should lock the screen, if he/she leaves
his/her workstation without logging out.

3.1.3

3.1.3.1

Som e Issues about the login process

L ocal L ogin to U nix w orkstation(A IX , R edhat L IN U X )

After the Kerberos has been deployed on the CS department’s LAN, the regular
login has been replaced with the Kerberized login— “klogin”. When a user sits in
front of any UNIX (AIX, Redhat LINUX) workstation and wants to login, the user
types in his/her login ID and Kerberos password. The Kerberized login —“klogin” —
then encrypts an authenticator using his/her Kerberos password and transfers the
authenticator (including the service name TGS —Ticket Granting Service, and a time
stamp) and his/her login ID to the KDC. The KDC knows the user’s Kerberos
password, so the KDC tries to decrypt the authenticator. If the KDC succeeds, the
KDC sends back a TGT and “klogin” lets the user login. (A more detailed
description of the process of obtaining TGT is in chapter 2) If the login does not
succeed,

“klogin” will do the same thing as the regular login program namely

compare the password the user typed with his/her local password stored in
“/etc/passw d” (or “/etc/shadow ”, if a shadow-password mechanism is used). If the
password matches, “klogin” lets the user login without obtaining the TGT. If the user
still wants to obtain the TGT, the user has to use “kinit” and types in the correct
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Kerberos password to get it. After the user has the TGT, the user can use any
Kerberized service o f the heterogeneous network without typing a password. It’s very
convenient and secure.

3.1.3.2

L ocal L ogon to N T W orkstation/Server

Cygnus Solutions Inc. provides a freeware Kerberos package for NT, which
includes the KDC service, the Kadmin service, and the Kerberized client softwares
such as kinit, kpasswd, kerbnet, ktelnet and gina. The KDC service and Kadmin
service can only run on NT server/workstation, the Kerberized client software can
run on Windows 95 or Windows NT server/workstation. So an N T machine can be
configured to be a KDC.
The “gina” package is login software that can replace the regular N T login
software. There are two installation options for “gina”: Kerberos authentication
required, and Kerberos authentication not required.

•

Kerberos authentication not required
If this option is chosen, When a user logs on, first, “gina” will check the password

the user typed in with the Windows NT PDC (Primary Domain Controller) to see if
it matches the password stored in the PD C’s password database. If it does not match,
“gina” gives the user a message box that says something like “password wrong, retry”
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and won’t let the user logon. If the password matches, “gina” will try to obtain a
T G T from the KDC using the password the user typed in. If the password the user
typed in is the same as his/her Kerberos password, “gina” will obtain a TGT
implicidy for the user and let the user logon. If the password the user typed is not the
same as his/her Kerberos password, but is same as his/her N T domain password,
“gina” will give the user a message box that says something like “Kerberos password
wrong and can not obtain T G T” and let the user logon without obtaining the TGT.
•

Kerberos authentication required
If this option is chosen, the process is almost the same as the above scenario,

except that when the user’s password matches the PD C’s stored password but
doesn’t match his/her Kerberos password, “gina” still gives the user a message box
that says something like “Kerberos password wrong, retry” and won’t let the user
logon. Thus, in this case, the user’s password in the Windows N T PDC must match
the Kerberos password to be able to login NT workstation or server.

3.1.3.3

O ver-the-netw ork telnet from W indow s 9 5 /N T to U N IX
(AIX, R edhat L IN U X )

•

Using non-Kerberized telnet
If the application servers have been configured so that they can accept non-

Kerberized clients, then a user can use non-Kerberized client software such as regular
TELN ET, FTP, and etc. Due to the large existing base o f non-Kerberized
applications, normally, the application servers need to be configured to accept non-
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Kerberized client applications. Suppose a user uses a non-Kerberized application,
such as regular telnet, to telnet to the remote Kerberos-enhanced AIX or LINUX
workstation. When the user types in his/her login ID and password, the user’s
password will be transferred to the remote machine in clear text. So if someone is
eavesdropping on the Internet or CS department Ethernet, he/she can catch the
user’s password and impersonate the user later. When the user’s login ID and
password have been transferred to the remote machine’s Kerberized login software,
the process of obtaining the TGT is same as local login. If the user wants to use other
services in the Kerberos realm from the CS department workstation, the user doesn’t
need to type his/her password anymore, since the user has a TG T for the whole
Kerberos realm. That means if the user uses a regular telnet client to access a
Kerberos-enhanced network, then it’s safer than to use a regular telnet to access a
non-Kerberos-enhanced network. For example, assume that Kerberos has been
deployed on the CS department’s LAN. When a user uses a regular telnet client to
telnet to “garnet”, the user’s password will be transferred over the Internet in clear
text once. Then the user has a TGT that resides on “garnet”. Then if the user wants
to telnet to other machines from “garnet”, say, “ninepipe”, the user doesn’t need to
type his/her password again. The user only needs to type “telnet ninepipe”, the user
will be logged in without supplying a password, since the user is using the Kerberized
telnet client that resides in “garnet”. If the CS department’s LAN is not Kerberosenhanced, then when the user telnets to “garnet”, the user’s password will be
transferred over the Internet once. When the user wants to telnet to “ninepipe”, the
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user has to type his/her password again, so the user’s password will be transferred
over the Internet another time. Although it’s better, transferring the password in clear
text one time is enough for eavesdropper to catch it. So I encourage people to use
Kerberized client applications. Cygnus solution Inc. has a free package — Kerbnet
that includes kpasswd, kinit, ktelnet for Windows 95/N T. I wrote a GUI Kerberized
FTP for Windows 95/NT.
•

U sing Kerberized telnet
To use Kerberized telnet on Windows 95/N T,

“kinit” or “kerbnet” (GUI

software which combines “kinit” and “kpasswd” together) is needed to obtain the
TGT. Next, the Kerberized telnet can be launched which will automatically log the
user in.

3.1.4 Password Synchronization and U ser A ccount Setup
The scenarios for logon to NT domain and for login to UNIX (AIX, LINUX)
locally are quite different.
When a user logs in to UNIX, “klogin” will first try to match the password the
user typed in with his/her Kerberos password, if the match succeeds, “klogin” will let
the user login. If it does not succeed, “klogin” works like regular login that checks the
password the user typed in with his/her local password. If it matches, “klogin” lets
the user login, if not, the user has to retry.
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When the user logs on to an NT domain, “gina” will first try to match the
password the user typed in with his/her N T domain password. If the password does
not match, “gina” let the user retry. If the password does match, “gina” will try to
obtain the TG T using the password the user typed in. If succeed, the user will logon
and get the TGT. If not, depending on which installation option of “gina” is chosen,
either the user can logon without obtaining the TG T or the user cannot logon with a
chance to try again.
This leads to an important issue on setting up user accounts and password
synchronization. Under the UNIX login scenario, the user only needs to know the
Kerberos password, the local password can be generated randomly and the user
doesn’t need to know it. When users change their passwords, they only need to
change the Kerberos password; the local passwords will never be changed. But on
NT, due to the “gina” logon scenario, if the user wants to achieve single logon, the
user’s N T domain password and Kerberos password must be kept the same.
For example, if I’m the system administrator, I need to open a user account for a
user, Joe. I can setup an user account “joe” on a workstation and generate a random
password for “joe” and propagate this local account to every UNIX workstation.
Then I need to setup a Kerberos user account “joe” for him and generate a Kerberos
password for “joe”, and Joe needs to know this Kerberos password. Then I setup an
N T domain user account “joe” for Joe, where the NT domain password is the same
as his Kerberos password. I also need to guarantee that the login ID is same for the
N T domain and Kerberos.
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When Joe wants to change his password, if he changes his password on UNIX, he
only needs to change his Kerberos password. After he is done, he might go to an NT
machine and want to logon, he can either logon without obtaining the TG T or simply
can’t logon depending on the “gina” installation option. So a mechanism is needed to
synchronize N T domain password changes and Kerberos password changes. I wrote
a Win32 GUI program “ntpasswd” which first changes the NT domain password and
then makes a system call to call “kpasswd” to change the Kerberos password.
“ntpasswd” first prompts the user to input his/her old password and new
password and confirmed new password, then calls the NetUserChangePasswordQ
API function to change the N T domain password. It then detects the environment
variables fHO M EDRIVE, $HOMEDIR, $ICPASSWD_PATH, and creates a
temporary file in the user’s home directory. It outputs the user’s old password and
new

password

and

confirmed

new

password

to

this

file,

then

through

$>I<PASSWD_PATH finds “kpasswd.exe”, and makes a system call like “kpasswd <
tmpfilename”, and then deletes the temporary file. Normally, in an N T environment,
each regular user may not have write permission on any directory except his/her own
home directory, that’s why I detect $HOMEDRIVE and $>HOMEDIR. This
guarantees that the creation of the temporary file will be successful. Normally, only
the user has full control on his/her home directory; other users, even the
administrator, don’t have read rights on the user’s home directory. Because the
temporary file contains the user’s password in clear text, if the system is setup with
home directories owned by users, putting this temporary file into the user’s home
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directory is safe. This means that after Kerberos has been deployed, if a user wants to
change his/her password, and doesn’t want to change it twice (once for Kerberos,
once for N T domain), the user needs to go to an N T workstation and uses
“ntpasswd” to change his/her password. See figure 3.1 for the interface of
“ntpasswd”.
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3.1.5

T he Cost o f D eploying Kerberos

The source code and executable of Kerberos on UNIX is freely available from
MIT. Cygnus Solution Inc. has an implementation of Kerberos on NT called
KerbNet that is also freely downloadable. KerbNet contains a Kerberized telnet
client for Windows 95/NT. I wrote a Kerberized FTP client for Windows 95/NT.
I’m going to make it a freeware. After the Kerberos has been deployed, it should be
fairly easy for users to use. It’s also fairly easy for the CS students to download, install
and use the Kerberized client software (such as Kerberized TELN ET and FTP) on
their personally owned PCs. Thus, all of the software is free.

3.2 Two T est N etw ork M odels
I have setup two test network models.
•

M odel one
I used a Pentium Pro 200 machine (“dillon”) running Redhat LINUX 2.0 as a

master KDC, a Pentium 120 machine (“glasgow”) running Redhat LINUX 2.0 as an
application server and client (see figure 3.2).
I installed MIT Kerberos Version 5 on “dillon”. I downloaded the source code of
MIT Kerberos Version 5 and compiled it to get the executable, since MIT only
provides the source code for Kerberos Version 5. I installed Kerbnet Kerberos from
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Cygnus solutions Inc. on “glasgow”. I installed MIT Kerberos Version 5 on
“glendive”.
•

M odel two
I used a IBM PowerStation 220 machine —“gaesl” —running AIX4.1 as master

KDC, a Pentium 200 machine —“dillon” —which is installed Redhat LINUX 2.0 as
slave KDC and application server, a Pentium 120 machine —“glasgow” —which is
installed Windows N T server 4.0 as client (see figure 3.3).
I installed Kerbnet Kerberos for AIX on “gaesl”. I installed MIT Kerberos
Version 5 into “dillon”. I installed Kerbnet Kerberos for NT into “glasgow”.
Both test network models met the goals I mentioned in Chapter 1, except for goal
# 2 — “Users should be able to change their password from any workstation”. The
MIT Kerberos and Cygnus Kerberos work perfectly together. Actually, Cygnus just
uses the MIT Kerberos source code and modifies it to be easy-to-install and more
user-friendly. Cygnus also developed an NT Kerberos version. Both networks can
accept both non-Kerberized clients and Kerberized clients. This will guarantee that a
lot o f non-Kerberized clients, especially in a Windows or Mac environment will still
work. I tested ntpasswd on “glasgow”, it works perfectly. It guarantees the
synchronization of N T domain password change and Kerberos password change.
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Chapter 4

A Multi-threaded Implementation of
Kerberized FTP for Windows 9 5 /N T

4.1 U sing “Kerberized” Applications
Client/server applications must be modified to use Kerberos for authentication.
The process of modifying the applications to make it Kerberos-aware is called
Kerberizing. Kerberizing an application is the most difficult part of installing
Kerberos. Fortunately, the MIT Kerberos implementation includes most of the
popular applications for Unix (the Berkeley R-commands, telnet, and POP) that have
been Kerberized. Other applications have been Kerberized by vendors and are
included in their supported products, such as Cygnus Solutions Inc.’s KerbNet
System. The availability of Kerberized applications will improve with time.
It is generally necessary to modify the client/server protocol when Kerberizing an
application, unless the protocol designer has already made provisions for an
authentication exchange.
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More recent implementations of Kerberos provide a Generic Security Services
Application Programmer Interface (GSSAPI). The G SSAPI provides a standard
programming interface that is authentication mechanism independent. Using G SSAPI allows the
application programmer to design an application and application protocol which can use alternative
different authentication technologies, including Kerberos [6]. The use o f the GSSAPI in
application programs is recommended wherever possible.
Because it is a generic authentication interface, the GSSAPI does not support all
o f the functionality provided by Kerberos. For example, Kerberos’s notion of userto-user authentication is not currently supported. Hence, an application programmer
will not always be able to use the GSSAPI in all cases, and may have to use the
Kerberos API in order to use some features.

4.2 Introduction to GSSAPI
The GSSAPI provides generic security services to its callers, and is intended for
implementation on top of alternative underlying authentication protocols. Typically,
GSSAPI callers will be application protocols into which security enhancements are
integrated through invocation of services provided by the GSSAPI. The GSSAPI
allows a caller application to authenticate a principal identity associated with a peer
application, to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as
confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis.
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There are four stages to using the GSSAPI:
•

The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may prove its identity to other
processes. The application's credentials vouchfor its global identity, which may or may not be
related to the local username under which it is running

•

A pair of communicating applications establish a joint security context using their credentials.
The security context is a pair of G SSAPI data structures that contain shared state information,
which is required in order that per-message security services may be provided. A s part of the
establishment of a security context, the context initiator is authenticated to the responder, and
may require that the responder is authenticated in turn. The initiator may optionally give the
responder the right to initiate further security contexts.

This transfer of rights is termed

delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, similar to those used by the originating
application, but which may be used by the responder. To establish and maintain the shared
information that makes up the security context, certain G SSAPI calls will return a token data
structure, which is a cryptographicallyprotected opaque data type. The caller of such a G SSAPI
routine is responsiblefor transferring the token to the peer application, which should then pass it
to a corresponding G SSAPI routine which will decode it and extract the information.
•

Per-message services are invoked to apply either:
(a), integrity and data origin authentication, or
(b). confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication to application data, which are treated
by G SSAPI as arbitrary octet-strings. The application transmitting a message that it wishes to
protect will call the appropriate G SSAPI routine (sign or seal) to apply protection, specifying the
appropriate security context, and send the result to the receiving application. The receiver will
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pass the received data to the corresponding decoding routine (verify or unseal) to remove the
protection and validate the data.
•

A t the completion of a communications session (which may extend across several connections), the
peer applications call G SSAPI routines to delete the security context. Multiple contexts may
also he used (either successively or simultaneously) within a single communications association
[6].

4.3 FTP Security Extension

4.3.1 Introduction

The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in STD 9, RFC 959[7] uses
usernames and passwords passed in clear text to authenticate clients to servers (via
the USER and PASS commands), except for services such as “anonymous” FTP
archives. This leads to a security risk that passwords can be stolen through
monitoring of local and wide-area networks.
Except for the problem of authenticating users in a secure manner, there is also
the problem o f authenticating servers, protecting sensitive data and/or verifying its
integrity.

An attacker may be able to access valuable or sensitive data simply by

monitoring a network. An active attacker may also initiate spurious file transfers to
and from a site of the attacker’s choice, and may invoke other commands on the
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server. FTP does not currendy have any provision for the encryption or verification
o f the authenticity o f commands, replies, or transferred data.

4.3.2 T he FTP Security E xtension Standard
FTP Security Extension Standard addresses (adapted from [8], RFC 2228):
1. How to authenticate users to servers in a secure manner.
2. How to protect command channel.
Command MIC is used to protect the integrity of the command channel (Other
people can not modify the command channel); Command E N C is used to
protect the privacy o f the command channel (Other people can not see the
contents o f the command channel).
3. How to protect data channel.
Command PROT and PBSZ are used to protect the data channel.
The following commands are optional, but dependent on each other. They are
extensions to the FTP Access Control Commands.
AUTH (Authentication/Security Mechanism)
ADAT (Authentication/Security Data)
PROT (Data Channel Protection Level)
PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size)
CCC(Clear Command Channel)
MIC (Integrity Protected Command)
CONF (Confidentiality Protected Command)
ENC (Privacy Protected Command)
-— from [8]
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In my Kerberized FTP, I implemented AUTH, AD AT (for authentication), MIC
and E N C (for protection of control channel).

4.4 Im plem entation o f Kerberized FTP
The Kerberized FTP client is a GUI, multithreaded application for Windows 95
and Windows NT). This FTP client implements four new FTP extension commands
(AUTH, ADAT, MIC, ENC) and all the basic regular FTP commands (such as
SE N D , RECV, USER, LIST, etc.).
Some features:
•

Can connect to Kerberized FTP servers and regular FTP servers: Due to the
large base of existing regular FTP server, the Kerberized FTP client can connect
to both Kerberized FTP servers and regular FTP servers.

•

Multithreaded: When sending, receiving, and listing files, a new thread will be
launched to guarantee that the transfer of large amount of data won’t block the
GUI interface. So you can browse the local file system, see online help and
“about” information while transferring a big file or a large directory.

•

U ses the Registry to maintain m ost recently connected hosts: This uses the
system registry database to store the most recently connected host names. So next
time, when you want to connect to the host which has been connected before,
you can just choose its name from the “host” droplist.
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•

Display local and remote file system visually: This uses two listview windows
to display local and remote file system visually. You can browse local and remote
file systems just like “WS-FTP”.

•

Indicate the progress of file transfer: This uses a progress bar to indicate the
progress of file transfer visually and how much data has been transferred.

•

Beep to indicate file transfer finished: After a file transfer is done, a beep will
remind you that file transfer is done.

4.4.1

Im plem entation o f the A uthentication Part

To Kerberize an application, the most important part is the authentication part.
The authentication part must be rewritten to support whatever authentication
mechanism you want to support. Using GSSAPI will make this job a little easier but
cannot achieve all the functionality provided by the underlying authentication
protocol. But in general, GSSAPI will be sufficient for most situations. I used
GSSAPI to write my Kerberized FTP client.
The following is the state transition diagram for the authentication part:
Two common paths:
•

For non-Kerberized FTP server (fo llo w --------------- ► path).

•

For Kerberized FTP server (fo llo w ---------------- >

path).

USER

U nauthenticate d
(new connection)
AUTH

V I

234

334
Need Security Data

ADAT
4yz, 5yz

335

235
Authenticated
USER
2yz

Need Password
PASS

Authorized Login

Figure 4.1: Login Authentication State Diagram
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4.4.2

H ow to use the Kerberized FTP

This GUI Kerberized FTP client supports both Kerberized FTP server and
regular FTP server. To use the F IT to open a connection to remote Kerberized FTP
server, you have to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket first using Kerbnet System
explicitly, or if your operating system is Windows NT, you can obtain a Ticket
Granting Ticket through the program “gina” which replaces the regular logon and
obtains the ticket for you implicitly.
Here is how to use Kerbnet System to obtain Ticket Granting 'Ticket.
•

After double clicking Kerbnet icon you g e t:

KerhNet

End Time

Ticket

No Tickets

Change Passw ord

Figure 4.2. Initial Kerbnet Interface
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•

After typing UserlD, password, realm (only needed the very first time you use
Kerbnet) and then click login button, you get:

■x
File

H e lp

Start Time

End T im e

Ticket

Mar 10 09:13

Mar 10 19:13

krbtgt/C S.UM T.EDU@ CS.UM T.EDU (FPI) B

■

sss rasBraesnlB

UMT.EDU

trange Password...

.

.

.

:;

......

;J

Figure 4.3. After obtaining Ticket Granting Ticket

•

After you have obtained the Ticket Granting Ticket, you can launch Kerberized
FTP by double clicking on its icon. 'There are two options in the login window,
privacy and integrity. The integrity option is the default option, which guarantees
the integrity of the command channel. With this option, intruders can not modify
any FTP command. The privacy option encrypts the command channel, which
guarantees both the integrity and the privacy. With this option, intruders can not
see and modify any FTP command.

Remote System

File name

“iie name

ChangeOir

Rle tise

ghangeDir
. MakeDir

KFTP.HLP
M FC42D.DLL

& Login

Rename

M FCN42D.DLL
M SVCRTD.DLL

I' "

R em ove

..................
Host Name ; | d illn n .c s.u m t.e d u

gssapi.dll

R e fe s h

KFTP.GID

kftaexe

£

U serlD;

|iian|

C Privacy

(*

Integrity

Cancel

j

...................
------

I iiiiiiii iiiii
■
: '*ssn
.. » «::
srwsw
Option

Figure 4.4. GSS_FTP initial Interface
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•

Type or choose a host name and type your user name and click “O K ” button.

GSS FTP Connected to : dillon.cs.umt.edu

/h o m e / nan

C:\Kftp

;; ,
File name

...

File name

File te e

0
KFTP.HLP
M FC42D.DLL

1393152
4 1 9E

M SVCRTD.DLL

373248

gssapi.dll

3347C3

&
*

B
FriMJ
Tue

KFTP.GID

kftp.exe

1024

iS .x fm

10177

M FCN42D.DLL

hie

..

Ref e, h

k—

1024

FVW M 95-2-er...

name

1664

Remove

.Xauthority

0

.X defaults

3785

E e fe *

.bash_history

TueR Diflnfo
- .

56321

1024

mail

.b a s h jo g o u t
,bash_profile

220

1 $ hashrc

200

.'V .pinerc

10322

xe

jsio >

___
«• Binary

_______________________

*

MH9HB
«W:.

S

:■

llliS I l!

[BINARY.mode data connection for
complete.

* I ..
. r■. ■
!

■n

r7
Close

3 1.1

1I.

' r

*»-.•»» .•,*«!-. .

i
Log

jI

...

.

oHelp
I

____

mUssm

'I

.............

Figure 4.5. After Logon
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•

After you logon, you can recheck the Kerbnet window and see that the Ticket for
the FTP server has been obtained.

•

Then, you can browse the local and remote file systems through the two listview
windows and choose what to transfer.
To know7more about how to use this FTP client, please see the online help system

of the Kerberized FTP.

File
•

mmam^

Help
: "■

■

,

Start T im e
........... — L —

E n d T im e

T ick et

M a r1 0 10:56

Mar 10 20:56

krbtgt/CS UMT E DU @ CS.UM T.ED U (FPI)

M a r1 0 10:57

Mar 10 20:56

ftp/dillon.cs.um t.edu@ CS.UMT.EDU (FP)

:

P
accwnrri
rdoSvVOiu

“;

. ...

B
oat
n.edl

CS UMT.EDU
. „

.._ x _

I

h a n g e P a ssw o rd ...

\
,

Figure 4.6. After obtaining FTP service ticket

Chapter 5
Conclusions
This project consists of two parts. The first part is to find a feasible solution to
unify the authentication for the heterogeneous networks of the CS department at the
University o f Montana. The goals include:
•

A global user account database, which means that any user must be able to login
to the same account with the same password on any workstation

•

Users should be able to change their password from any workstation

•

Any system must work with a shadow password system on both AIX and LINUX

•

Users should be able to access any workstation over the Internet (for example, a
student or faculty should be able to login to a workstation using a PPP
connection to an ISP from home)

•

Unencrypted passwords should not be transferred over the network (including the
LAN o f CS department and the Internet)

•

The solution should be relatively easy to use, maintain, and administrate
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investigated and studied a lot about how Kerberos works, how to administrate
Kerberos, how to make the use of Kerberos as transparent as possible. Chapter 2
covers most of these topics. I’ve set up two small test networks to test if Kerberos
can really satisfy the CS department’s requirements. Chapter 3 covers this. I also
wrote a program “ntpasswd” which synchronizes an N T domain password and a
Kerberos password. Note that the goal #2 —“Users should be able to change their
passwords from any workstation” was not met.
There are Kerberos implementations both on UNIX and on N T which means
that a UNIX or a NT machine can be used as the KDC. Due to the small size o f the
CS department at the University of Montana, the CS department won’t want to spend
a lot of money on the KDCs. Two Intel 486 machines should be enough for the
KDCs. Because N T is not as stable as UNIX and N T ’s system overhead is bigger
than UNIX, the performance o f a Intel 486 machine running N T server 4.0 is much
poorer than that o f a Intel 486 machine running LINUX. So I recommend using two
Intel 486 machine running LINUX as the KDCs.
Client/server applications must be modified to use Kerberos for authentication;
such Kerberos-aware applications are said to be Kerberized. Kerberizing an
application is the most difficult part o f installing Kerberos. Fortunately, the MIT
reference implementation includes the popular applications (the Berkeley Rcommands, telnet, and POP) for a variety o f UNIX platforms with support for
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Kerberos already added. Cygnus Inc. also provides a free software package Kerbnet
for W in95/N T that includes a program used for obtaining a Ticket Granting Ticket,
a Kerberized telnet, and more. But they didn’t provide a Kerberized FTP for
W in95/NT. This leads to the second part of this project, developing a Kerberized
FTP for W in95/NT. I investigated the FTP protocol, the FTP security extension
protocol, GSSAPI and more. I used Visual C ++ 5.0 and the Cygnus GSSAPI library
to develop this GUI Kerberized FTP for W in95/NT. Chapter 4 covers this software.
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